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DIFFERENCES IN LEVELS
OF VOTER TURNOUT
AMONG THE MEXICAN STATES
David R. Hansen, Errol L. King, and Samuel H. Peterson

Abstract
[/I the 20()() electiollS, voter turnout l'aried wide0' mnong Mexican states, /1vm as high

72 to as low I1S 52 percent, This article luill answer the question: Why did voter
turnout vary among the states during Mexico's 2000 presidential elections? We
will show how levels o/weafth, educdtio/l, alld other resources, as well as indigenous
ClI!ture, are injlue/ltiaf in expldining variations in l'ott'r turnout, 1X'0 will determine
tI){' illf!uolce of'these l'ariabfes 011 IJ(Jter turnollt throllgh regressio/l allf10,sis of'the
thirf)'-two st{lfes lif'Mexico and (,dse studies of'the Fedeml District, Guerrero, Chidpas,
ilnd YUCilttlll,

ilS

Presentation of Research Question and Puzzle

I

t is important to understand voter turnout because it can indicate the
health of democracy in a country or other political unit, As Mark
Franklin write'S, "Participation is the lifeblood of democracy" (Franklin
1996, 216), Arend Lijphart reinforces this by asserting that political
participation through voting is one of several "basic democratic ideals"
(Lijphart 1997, 1), Political participation can indicate a strong political culture and high levels of citizen involvement in government, In addition, it
enables all groups of society to influence policy outcomes,
Because of its importance, many political scientists have examined
variation in voter turnollt among countries. In spite of the many efforts to
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explain voter turnout using national level variables such as compulsory
voting laws, party structure, salience of elections, proportionality of the
electoral system, and weekend voting (Franklin 1<)96,217; Jackman 1987,
407-09), few have attempted to explain variation in voter turnout within
countries outside of the United States. There is much variation among
subnational divisions in terms of voter turnout that cannot be explained
by an analysis of international variation.
We are particularly interested in the intranational varia.tion of voter
turnout in Mexico. In the most recent presidential elections, voter turnout
varied by as much as 20 percent berween Mexican states, as in Chiapas,
which had the lowest turnout levels in the country at 52.2 percent, and
neighboring Yucatan, which had the highest turnout at 72.0 percent (lFE
[2]). Other examples of neighboring states with high levels of variation
in voter turnout included Baja California and Baja California Sur, whose
levels of voter turnout differed by 10 percent. The levels of voter turnout
of rwo northern states, Durango and Jalisco, also differed by approximately
10 percent. If geography were the only factor in explaining voter turnout,
we would expect voter turnout to be more homogenous within regions, if
not nationwide. It is difficult to say that these differences are the result of
random variation because, as we will show, significant patterns are visible
in the state-by-state data. In this article we will address the puzzle: Why
does this variation of voter turnout occur within a country that has the
same electoral laws in all of its states?

Theoretical Background
We believe that a combination of resource, instrumental motivation,
and cultural theories explains discrepancies in the levels of state voter
turnout in Mexico. These theories, as we found in our data analysis, can
be mutually reinforcing, and difIerent theories may have varying levels
of applicability in difIerent states. In certain areas a history of extreme internal conflict may also affect attitudes toward voting, such as in the
case of Chiapas. We will explain the effects of conflict using instrumental
motivation theory.
To explain cross-state variations in voter turnout, we intend to use
resource theory and instrumental motivation theory, which are described
by Mark Franklin in his chapter "Electoral Participation" in the book
Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Pmpectives. Simply
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stated, resource theory is the idea that "people participate who have the
time and money to do so" (Franklin 1996, 220). In this view, the rich, the
educated, and those who have time to spare will be more likely to vote
than the poor, the uneducated, and those who have little time. Steven ).
Rosenstone argues that this is because voting, like all types of political participation, imposes an opportunity cost on scarce resources that the poor
or unemployed could otherwise use to improve their economic situation
(Rosenstone 1982,41). According to Lijphart, "the inequality of representation and inAuence [is] ... systematically biased in [1.Vor of more privileged citizens-those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better
education-and against less advantaged citizens" (Lijphart 1997, 1).
Lijphart supports this by referring to a study by Harold F. Gosnell: "Gosnell ... found that turnout increased with economic status and that 'the
more schooling the individual has the more likely he is to register and vote
in presidential elections'" (Lijphart 1997, 2). Thus, if resource theory
is correct, we should see higher voter turnout in states with high average
levels of education, wealth, and other resources. States with chronic
poverty and low levels of education would be expected to exhibit lower
voter turnout.
Instrumental motivation theory suggests that voters will be more likely
to vote if they feel that their vote will positively inAuellce the electoral
outcome. This theory implies that an individual voter makes a cost-benefit
analysis, consciously or not, involving the likelihood that her vote will
affect public policy, the degree to which sllch an effect would benefit
her, and the costs of voting. One important factor in this costbenefit analysis is the level of contestation between parties or candidates
in the election. A citizen will be more likely to vote in a close election, becallse she will perceive that her vote is more likely to swing the outcome
toward her favored candidate. Thus, we expect that if instrumental motivation theory is accurate, we should see higher voter turnout in states
where an election is close, more is at stake, or the costs of voting are lower
(Franklin 1996, 221).
One particular aspect of the cost-benefit analysis found in instrumental motivation theory is the effect of the threat of violence on voter
turnout. Disruption caused by factors such as armed conAict and extreme
social tension can have a negative impact on the willingness and ability of
people to vote. This will occur in cases of extreme violence and societal
SIGMA
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unrest because of increased danger of violence to those who use their vote
oppose armed groups. Conflict, intimidation, political coercion, and
other disruptions may also indicate reduced perceptions of democratic
legitimacy, which would increase citizens' reluctance to vote. We have
found that this application of instrumental motivation theory is particularly useful in explaining the low levels of voter turnout in the southern
state of Chiapas, which has experienced a great deal of armed conflict in
the past decade.
In our analysis of voter turnout, we will also employ an indigenous
culture theory. We believe that high levels of indigenous culture in certain
Mexican states will tend to lower voter turnout. Much of this effect stems
from indigenous Mexicans' perceptions of themselves as alienated from
the mainstream of their society and from the benefits of representative
government. They may not feel that national representative institutions
address their particular needs, or they may be uninformed about the larger
issues in an election because of limited language skills and insufficient access to media information on elections. Indigenous people may even feel
that the national government is hostile toward them and their interests. As
Wendy K. Tam eho writes:
to

If minorities have infimnational and social networks that provide unique political information and a different source of
polirical socialization, they may not derive the same sort of satisfacrion from aHlrming allegiance to the political system or
have the same sense of responsibility for preserving the democraticprocess. (Cho 1999,1144)
In particular, we will examine the effects of large monolingual indigenous
language populations on voter turnout. We believe that large monolingual
indigenous populations in a state will lead to lower voter turnout. As Cho
claims in her study of immigrant political socialization, proficiency in the
dominant language of one's country greatly improves the possibilities
for political participation. Her analysis implies that at least a minimum
proficiency is important in overcoming bureaucratic processes in registering to vote and obtaining information about political issues.
Cho also argues that "minority populations have a tendency ... to establish ethnic communities or neighborhood clusters" (Cho 1999, 1144).
An indigenous village with many citizens that do not speak Spanish will
be less likely to feel itself a part of Mexican society than a village where
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bilingual or monolingual Spanish speakers predominate. Monolingual
speakers of an indigenous language will likely be less informed about election issues and may hold a more parochial perspective than Spanish speakers who have access to a national media perspective. Maria Paris, writing
for the Instituto Federal Electoral, shows that Mexican speakers of indigenous languages are likely to be less tolerant of other races, religions, and
political backgrounds than non-indigenous Mexicans (n.d.). This easily
leads to alienation from the non-indigenous majority and the mestizodominated political system.
Furthermore, the cultural divide in Mexico appears to be widening, as
the populations of speakers of almost all of Mexico's indigenous languages
continue to grow, passing on their language and culture to future generations.
For example, from 1970 to 2000, the population of people speaking an indigenous language nearly doubled and now comprises over 6 percent of
the national population of Mexico (INEGI [4]). In all eleven states where
10 percent or more of the speakers of indigenous languages were monolingual, voter turnout was below the national average. The monolingual
population is a reflection of the level of integration of the indigenous population of a state. If indigenous culture is a fundamental determinant of
voter turnout, we expect to see lower levels of voter turnout in states with
deeply entrenched indigenous communities, as measured by a large proportion of indigenous people in a state, a low percentage of Spanish speakers, and large groups of monolingual speakers of an indigenous language.
In addition to instrumental motivation theory and resource theory,
Franklin also uses mobilization theory to explain voter turnout. This
theory holds that "citizens ... are more likely to participate if encouraged
to do so" (Franklin 1996, 220). Mobilization theory also stresses the importance of the "activities of groups and organizations (especially political
parties)" in increasing voter turnout (Franklin 1996, 220). This theory, although applicable, was not used in our analysis due to a lack of sufficiently
detailed information about the mobilization efforts of political and other
civic organizations in each Mexican state. To collect the necessary data to
examine mobilization theory, we would most likely need to conduct field
studies and other more in-depth research into efforts at mobilizing the
various groups of Mexican society.
We must keep in mind the reinforcing effect of these theories on one
another in predicting voter turnout. One theory may be more generally
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applicable and thus capable of establishing a rough baseline prediction for
voter turnout, which is then modified by more state-specific variables. Resource theory, for example, is applicable to all states because of its focus on
variables that are seen in all states of a country, such as levels of wealth and
education. As Franklin points our, instrumental motivation theory and resource theory are often highly interrelated, as citizens whose opportunity
cost of voting, in time and effort expended, is higher are probably less
likely to vote. Our indigenous culture theory, in contras~, may have
high predictive and explanatory power in particular cases, such as that of
Chiapas and other states with large indigenous groups, while being unable
to explain anything about voter turnout in an area where indigenous
culture has no significant presence.
We must also note that causative variables from different theories
may be correlated with one another. For example, indigenous culture may
affect the amount of education that a person may receive, while an advanced education may cause an individual to reject many aspects of her indigenous heritage. The presence of high correlations between some of our
independent variables indicated the possibility of multicollinearity, which
can produce unreliable regression results. For example, there was a large
correlation (R=0.77) between average years of school and per capita GOP.
To overcome the problem of multicollinearity, since the variables used to
examine a particular theory will most likely be closely related, such as different variables measuring education or wealth, we eliminated some of
these redundant variables from the regression.

Regression Analysis
To support our thesis, we ran several regressions on the variables we
thought would be most useful in supporting or undermining the theories
we used to explain voter turnout. Though we discovered some possible
problems with our data, we were able to mitigate them by using statistical
techniques. Among the group of variables we examined, we found that indigenolls culture had the most significant influence on voter turnout.
To examine the contestation element of instrumental motivation
theory, we used the difference in vote share between the top two votegetting parties in each state in the 2000 legislative elections to indicate the
level of competition in state elections. To assess the theory that states with
high percentages of indigenous population have lower voter tumour, we
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Table 1: Influences on Voter Turnout
Independent
Variable
Percentage lllonolingual

ClleHicients (t-ratios) Coefficients (t-ratios) Coefllcients (t-ratios)

-0.24')' (141)

-Il.l R I (-1.702)

--

0.11.)(1.\15)

0.09')7 (J.()H7)

0.111 (1.220)

\'ote ~harc of top two
parties

O.O')Wi (I.OW;)

0.094') (1.0.,6)

00752 (O.R03)

Per capita COP

0.05')') (1.1')6)

O.O.l(,8 (1.221)

0.05') I" (1.888)

--

-j. ')47 (-O.HS4)

-0.4,')" (-2677)

')2.6')7' (6,,1')2)

53.R4Y (6.427)

')0582" (').995)

Adjusted R'

n.,91

0.386

0,,143

F-r~ltio

,).')S4"

4.9(),)'

5.052'

indigenous

Percentage Catholic
Difference between

Chiapas and Oaxaca
Dummy

Constant

Dependent variable: Percentage voter turnout
* indicates p :0. OJ)')
H
indicates p:O. 0.1 ()

measured the level of indigenous cultural influence as the percentage of a
state's indigenous population that speaks only an indigenous language. We
found this to be a more accurate depiction of the depth of indigenous
culture in an area than the percentage of the population that spoke an indigenous language without regard for other languages spoken because it
takes into account the level of indigenous integration into or alienation
from mainstream Mexican society. We collected data on gross domestic
product (GDr) per capita in each state (INEGI [7]) in order to test resource theory's implication that people with more wealth tend to vote
more. We also found data on the percentage of people who identified
themselves as Catholic in a given state, which enabled us to control for religious affiliation, which varies widely among the states (INEGI [10]).
Regression 1 in Table 1 analyzes the relationship between the dependent variable of voter turnout (IFE [3]) and four independent variables:
SIGMA
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difference in vote share (IFE [3]), the percent of indigenous people who
are monolingual (INEGI [9)), per capita GOP (INEGI [7]), and percentage of Catholics (INFGI [10]). We chose the first three independent
variables to test the relative importance on a national level of each of our
principal theories (instrumental motivation, indigenous culture, and resource theories, respectively). We also included the level of Catholicism
(INEGI 10) in a state to check for possible religious effects on voter
turnout. Because our analysis did not find levels of Catholicism to have a
significant influence on voter turnout, we did not include' it in our case
studies.
The most statistically significant correlation was with the indigenous
monolingual variable, which showed a p-value of 0.004. Its regression
coefficient value of -0.245 showed that, for a 1 percent increase in the percentage of monolingual speakers of indigenous languages, voter turnout
decreased by 0.245 percent. In contrast, on a state-by-state level, the level
of Catholicism, the average number of years in schoo!, and the difference
between the top two vote shares proved inefl-ective at predicting voter
turnout. The correlations of these variables with voter turnout were not statistically significant (p>0.2), and their associated regression coefficients were
too small for the variables to have much substantive effect on voter turnout.
Taken together, the regression using these four variables had an R2
value of 0.391, meaning that the regression equation using these four
variables can explain 39.1 percent of the variation in voter turnout across
states. The regression's F-ratio of 5.984 indicates that the variables in the
regression, taken together, have a statistically significant effect on voter
turnout with a p-value of less than 0.01.
Our model's R2 value of approximately 0.4 shows less predictive
significance than several studies of cross-national variation in voter
turnout. For example, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., claims several R2 values of
0.9 or greater in his study of the effects of various electoral laws and sets of
political institutions on voter turnout (Powell 1986, 25). Robert W. Jackman obtains R2 values as high as 0.97 in his comparison of voter turnout
among industrial democracies (Jackman 1987,412-16). Though we cannot claim such high values of statistical significance, the relative difficulty
of obtaining such predictive power is exacerbated by the small sample size
and limited scope of our study to one election year. Idiosyncratic factors
not easily captured in such a limited stlldy, such as regional weather
30
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conditions and the details of local electoral races, may playa role in explaining voter turnout. Theories that we were unable to examine, such as
Franklin's mobilization theory, might also explain some of this variation.
Statistical Concerns

It appears that Chiapas and Oaxaca may be outliers for some of our
independent variables, especially Catholicism and monolingual indigenous
percentages. To determine how significant the effect of these outliers was
(regression 2 in Table 1), we created a dummy variable for Chiapas and
Oaxaca (1 =Chiapas or Oaxaca; O=all other states) and tested it with the
variables that we used in our previolls regression. When we performed
the regression with the dummy variable, the R' value decreased slightly
to 0.386, but the overall regression retained a high level of statistical
significance (p=0.003), with the F statistic decreasing to 4.905. The monolingual indigenous percentage variable, however, became only marginally
statistically significant and lost some of its predictive power, with its
p-value increasing to 0.101 and its regression coefficient declining to
-0.181. Including the dummy variable in the regression had little effect on
any of the other variables.
'It) determine whether the level of monolingual indigenous population
has an influence on voter turnout apart from the influence of outliers,
we performed the regression again without the monolingual indigenous
variable, but including the dummy variable (regression 3 in Table 1).
We found the presence of the monolingual indigenous variable in regression
2 greatly reduced the statistical significance of the dummy variable and increased the R' value, indicating that the dummy variable is not as effective
as the monolingual indigenous variable in explaining voter turnout.
Since Chiapas may be an outlier, we will study its situation more
in depth in this article to determine some of the factors that affect its
low voter turnout and that will help us to determine whether it is an exceptional case or merely an extreme example of the effects of these statelevel variables. This analysis also prompts us to study more carefully the
role of indigenous culture in affecting voter turnout.
In addition, our quantitative analysis is limited by the fact that we are
using state-level variables to attempt to explain variation in voter turnout,
a variable that is inherently based on individual decisions and characteristics.
For example, while measures of indigenous culture are positively correlated
SICMA
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with voter turnout on a state-by-state basi~ with a significam degree of
predictive ability, we will take care to strengthen this correlation and show
causation by providing data to show the same inHuences in the behavior
of individual voters. For this reason, we will perform several case studies
to show the workings of our theories on an individual level.

Case Study of Mexico D.E
Though technically not a state, the election laws in tht: Federal District of Mexico (Mexico D.E) are very similar to those of other Mexican
states with regard to federal elections. Since the Federal District has its
own electoral districts and follows the same electoral law, we will include
it in our study, treating it like a state. In the 2000 elections, Mexico D.E
recorded the second highest voter turnout in the country behind Yucatan
with a voter turnout of 70.59 percent (lFE [3]).
Resource theory best describes voter turnout in Mexico D.E According to resource theory, an individual's proximity to a polling site could encourage or deter her from voting. On a national level, seven out of eleven
states that have more than 0.10 polling sites per square kilometer have
above-average voter turnout, while only four out of the twenty-one states
with less than 0.10 polling sites per square kilometer have above-average
voter turnout (CNIRT; IFE [3]). In the 2000 elections, Mexico D.E had
11,130 polling places, which means that there were almost seven and a
half polling sites per square kilometer. Most citizens of Mexico D.E could
walk to their polling site within a few minutes. The citizens in rural areas
of the rest of the states, however, would normally have to drive or ride
longer distances to reach their polling sites. A typical state such as Chihuahua, for example, had only 0.02 polling places per square kilometer.
The level of voter turnout in Chihuahua, at 58.2 percent, is significantly
lower than Mexico D.E's 70.6 percent (lFE [3]). Even if the citizens of
Mexico D.E were not better off economically, they would still have more
time to vote than residents of rural areas since most polling sites in the
capital are just a stone's throwaway.
The high per capita GOP and levels of education of the Federal District of Mexico also support resource theory's contention that the rich
and educated are more likely to vote. Mexico D.E's per capita GOP of
131,790 pesos is considerably higher than the average national per capita
GOP of 52,090 pesos and is almost double Chihuahua's 74,820 pesos
32
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(INEGI [7]). In addition, one study showed the average person older than
fifteen years of age in the Federal District has completed 9.4 grades compared
to the national average of 7.3. In contrast, states like Chiapas, Guerrero,
and Oaxaca all average six or less grades of schooling completed (INEGI
[8]). Mexico D.E also has the highest literacy rate: 97 percent compared to
the national average of 90.5 percent (lNEGI [3]). Thus, the combination
of proximity, income, and education in Mexico D.E all help to explain its
unusually high voter turnout.
Cultural rheory also helps explain Mexico D.E's high voter turnout.
The indigenous population is almost nonexistent in the Federal District,
accounting for only 1.8 percent of the total population. To make this
even less significant, only one person in every 10,000 is a monolingual
indigenous-language speaker. Since rhere is little deeply rooted indigenous
culture in Mexico D.E, this factor does not lower voter turnout.
The level of contestation in Mexico, D.E's 2000 elections was
probably not a significant factor in Mexico D.F.'s high level of voter
turnout. The vote shares of the top two parties were separated by 7 percentage points compared with a slightly higher national average of
10 percentage points.
Case Study of Guerrero

In order to further understand the effects of these variables on voter
turnout we will look at the state of Guerrero. This state is nearly an exact
opposite of Mexico D.E While the Federal District has the second
highest voter turnout, Guerrero had the second lowest voter turnout in
Mexico. Resource and culrural theory both playa role in explaining Guerrero's low turnout.
Guerrero is one of seventeen states with less than 0.10 polling sites per
square kilometer with below-average voter turnout. With 0.06 polli ng
sites per square kilometer, the average citizen of Guerrero has to travel a
considerable distance to reach the nearest polling site (CNIRT; IFE [3]).
In addition to Guerrero's largely rural population, the state's per capita GOP
is among the lowest in all of Mexico. At 27,800 pesos, the per capita
GOP in Guerrero is about half of the national average and only one-fIfth
of that of Mexico D.F.'s (lNEGI [7]). With such a low income in a rural
state, a trip to the polls could be out of the question for many voters.
Guerrero's economic adversity helps describe its low voter turnout.
SIGMA
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Education in Guerrero is also anemic compared to national levels.
The average person over the age of fifteen in Guerrero has only completed
six years of school and only three out of four people in the state are literate
compared to Mexico D.E's 97 percent literacy (lfE [8]; IFE [3]). It is
difficult for populations with low levels of education and low literacy
rates to become educated on political issues. Since Guerrero has such low
education and literacy levels, its citizens have few incentives to get out
and vote.
In addition, the percentage of monolingual speakers 'of indigenous
languages in Guerrero is the second highest in the country. Since Guerrero
has the second highest level of monolingual speakers of indigenous
languages, the state may be failing to integrate its population into the national political culture and society as a whole (IFE [4]). This is yet another
factor that discourages citizens of Guerrero from voting.
Instrumental motivation theory, in contrast with these explanations,
would predict a somewhat higher level of voter turnout ill Guerrero, since
the vote shares of the top two parties in Guerrero were separated by only
seven and a half percentage points. This is comparable to the Federal
District's level of contestation but not far off the national average, so its
impact on voter turnout would be minimal at best.

Case Study of Chiapas
In the 2000 presidential elections, Chiapas had the lowest level of
voter turnout in Mexico. The state's level of turnout, 52.19 percent, is remarkably low compared to the national average of 63. 97 percent (IFE [2]).
Chiapas is far behind the rest of Mexico in its level of voter turnout for
two reasons. First, the state is the poorest and least educated in Mexico.
According to resource theory, this poverty of resources causes people
to focus more on mere survival than issues such as politics and voting.
Second, violent conflict has existed in Chiapas f()f years. Instrumental motivation theory affirms that this violence increases the perceived costs of
voting, thus decreasing voter turnout.
According to resource theory, poverty has an effect on voter turnout.
As one author writes, "when a person experiences economic adversity, his
scarce resources are spent on holding body and soul together-survivingnot on remote concerns like politics" (Rosenstone 1982, 26). This is
apparently the case in Chiapas.
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Due to Chiapas's undesirable status as the poorest and least developed
state of Mexico, the people of Chiapas are the least likely to have the time
and money to vote. According to INEGI, the average citizen of Chiapas
makes 10.7 Mexican pesos per hour (slightly more than a U.S. Dollar).
This average wage is the lowest in the country and is a little more than half
of the national hourly average wage of 18,7 pesos (about 2 USD) (INEGI
[2)). Another indicator of Chiapas's poverty is the state's GDP, which is
also the worst in the country. The state GDP of 20,700 Mexican pesos
is less than half ofthe average state GDP of 51 ,090 pesos (lNEGI [6)).
Another factor affecting the low rate of voter tlLrnuut in Chiapas is the
level of social instability and political violence. Social instability, violence,
and their consequences have been particularly apparent in Chiapas, where
a state of upheaval has existed since 1994. Conflict in this state has
substantially decreased its level of voter turnout. Firsthand accounts and
other reports confirm the idea that instability and violence have created an
environment that is hostile to certain segments of the population due to
their political affiliations (Humanitari:tn Law Project).
To understand the inst:tbility and violence that exist in Chiapas and
their effect on voter participation, one must first understand something
about the source of such violence. On J:tnuary 1, 1994, a guerrilla group
known as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) started an
armed uprising. Although the revolt quickly lapsed into an unofficial
ceasefire, the region is said to be in a continuing state of low-intensity
war. Violent extralegal groups, such as the EZLN and their paramilitary
opposition, known as "Peace and Justice," continue to operate in the region. These groups, as well :ts the police and the Mexican army, have been
accused of human rights violations "involving everything from harassment
to murder" (Dent 2002, 303-04).
The effects of this "low intensity war" are particularly visible in the
voter turnout Elf the 1997 election. I n this election the state had a turnout
of only 35.81 percent, strikingly low compared to the 1991 turnout of
65,82 percent (IFE [5]). Although one IfE document attributes this to
the "low reliability of electoral data," other sources provide ample evidence that suggests that low voter turnout is attributable to disruption
from the regional conflict (IFE [4]).
One report from the International Service for Peace (SIPAZ) cited
several elector:tl irregularities that occurred as a result of the conflict in the
SIGMA

35

VOTER TURNOUT AMONG MEXICAN SIAIFS

region. For example, "polling booths were being set up adjacent to military camps, or in zones controlled by the PRIor by the paramilitary
group, 'Peace and Justice'; Zapatista-conrrolled towns acted to prohibit
polling booths in their communities; and military patrols stepped up activities in Zapatista strongholds" (SIPAZ). The report also states that on
the day of the election,
voters were reporredly drafted or coerced inro particIpating;
there were attacks and ambushes on voters by armed groups;
some voting booths did not allow tiJr privacy; voting instructions
and voter lists were incorrect or incomplete; political propaganda was distrihuted by parti~ans at polling places; election
ofllcials were absent at some polling places, etc. Abuses
inciud[cd] reports of stolen and burned ballots, highway
blockades, and other actions that otherwise impeded or made
voting difficult. (SIPAZ)

Under these conditions many could not "go to the polls because of the
insecurity and violence that reigns in that region" (SIPAZ).
Another source of evidence of the poor electoral conditions arising
from violence in the region is a report by the Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP). This report, titled "Chiapas: Burned Ballots and Absent Voters,"
details the experiences of a team of five sent to observe the election
process. This group cited various instances of intimidation. One example
occurred in the town of Tumbala, Chiapas, where "six heavily armed
policemen stood just to the right of the voting region. Given recent arrests
in this town which are being contested as politically motivated, their very
presence contributed to the air of intimidation." Another example was
cited from an unidentified town of Chiapas. According to the observers,
as one man was explaining to them the recent state of threats and violence,
the approach of another man caused the first to change his criticism to
praise of the progress of the elections. The group of observers concluded
"the conditions in this region were not conducive to fair elections,"
and "the people in this region did not feel conditions were either safe
enough or fair enough to warrant participation" (HLP).
Despite IFE's affirmation that "preparations to carry out fair elections
were in place," other organizations cited a "lack of guarantees" (IFE [4]).
Organizations like "citizen's councils, the PRO, the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, Civic Alliance, and indigenous and peasant organizations"
protested the lack of better conditions (SIPAZ).
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Although not as severe, the violence and social tension that affected
voter turnout in 1997 was still present during the 2000 elections. According to one report, men associated with security forces loitered around
polling places and "occasionally snapp[ed] pictures of the people lined up
to receive their ballots." The report also mentioned the existence of fear of
attacks by "paramilitary groups along the road out of sight of the election
observers stationed at the polling booths" (Nelson). This continuing intimidation was almost certainly one cause of Chiapas's low levels of voter
turnout in the 2000 elections.

Case Study of Yucatan
Yucatan is another particularly interesting case, especially when
contrasted with Chiapas. This state, in spite of its poverty and underdevelopment, has had very high levels of voter turnout. Yucatan's voter
turnout for the 2000 presidential elections, 71.96 percent, is the highest
state level in the country (IFE [3D. This elevated voter turnout is surprising,
given the state's poverty. High levels of contestation in the state might lead
us to expect instrumental motivation theory to explain this phenomenon.
Yucatan's high voter turnout is not explained by resource theory. Like
Chiapas, Yucatan is one of Mexico's poorer states. The average wage
in Yucatan is only 13.7 pesos per hour. This is about three pesos more
than the average wage in Chiapas but still significantly less than the
national average of 18.6 pesos (lNEGI [2D. The state economy as a
whole, indicated by the state CDP of 41,660 pesos, is higher than that of
Chiapas bur still not up to par with the national average of 51 ,090 pesos
(INEGI [6]).
Although resource theory fails to describe the high voter turnout
in this economically poor state, instmmental motivation theory succeeds. In
Yucatan there has been a high level of contestation between two parties,
specifically beTween the Partido Accion National (PAN) and the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PR!). This contestation is manifested in the
results of the 2000 presidential elections when PAN received 47.10
percent of the vote and PRI received 46.08 percent of the vote. The next
closest party received only 3.90 percent of the vote (lFE [3D. A high level
of contestation existed because neither party dominated the election. This
contestation indicates that instrumental motiVJtion theory may be helpful
in explaining the high level of turnout that exists in Yucatan.
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Conclusion
In summary, education, wealth, and other elements of resource theory
predict much of the variation in voter turnout. In addition to this, indigenous cultural theory enables us to understand how alienation and marginalization of indigenous populations can lead to lower levels of voter
turnout in states with large indigenous components. We discussed in our
article how monolingual speakers of indigenous languages, in particular,
can feel separated from the center of Mexican sociery. Though it has less
effect in most cases, instrumental motivation theory explains the case
of Yucatan, where the other theories' predictions fail. Chiapas's social
breakdown and violence exemplifY the devastation that violence and its
aftermath can wreak on democratic participation. Thus, the most accurate
predictions of voter turnout in individual cases include the interaction of
several variables.
The complexities of this analysis show the importance of understanding
the interactions between different causative variables explaining voter
turnout. We have been limited by the small sample of states available
to us, which has forced us to examine ollly a few of the variables that can
have the most influence on voter turnout. An interesting topic for future
study might involve taking a larger group of countries, controlling
for national-level variables, and examining the factors that influence
intranational variation in voter turnout in this larger sample. We were not
able to fully analyze such influences as the level of urbanization in an area,
the effect of religion, and differences in civic culture across regions. We
would also like to explore Franklin's theory of mobilization by examining
organizations and methods that might differ across states in their ability
to mobilize citizens to vote.
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